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Danquah's explanation of ntamoba,6 though derived from his experience in the neighbouring Akan state of Akyem Abuakwa, obviously resonates strongly with the details of the Bompata case in suggesting that a father's rights in his children could be terminated by the payment of compensation known as tamboba by the maternal family. So far, so good. But what of the oral sources?
Here is where the difficulties begin. Of those older Asantes with whom I have spoken in recent years, a majority did not recognise the term at all. Of those who recognised ntamoba and spoke with some confidence as they defined it, most remembered it as a marriage payment of one sort or another. A few, like Grace Amfum of Tafo, remember ntamoba as a payment by the husband-to-be to the future wife's matrilineal family (Amfum interview). Others recall a marriage payment either to the mother or to the father of the future wife. 'The parents give birth to a child,' explained Yaa Abrebrese, and they raise the child up. ... In the course of raising up the child, the child might urinate on them, do all sorts of terrible things. Therefore, to compensate for that, you give ntamoba to either of the parents to compensate them for the trouble they have taken in bringing the child up. [Abebrese interview] That the father of the wife-to-be was the sole recipient of this payment is the more common response among those who recall ntamoba as a part of the rites of marrying. It is a response I found to be particularly common in Kumasi, especially around the ahemfie (palace) at Manhyia, where the reminiscences of many echo those of Akosua Mansah:
If a man wants to marry a woman he goes to see the mother, and the mother says he should go and see the father. The father will ask that you pay the ntamoba....
It is the father who receives ntamoba. That is to let him know that he has a daughter who is married to someone. [Mansah interview]
The recollections of Nana Kyeame Owusu Banahene, one of the Asantehene's senior linguists, provide additional detail:
The one who begets the woman is called banintan [father; parent]. Now this man, whether he begets a girl or a boy, will be nursing the baby while the woman is cooking. Some time, that child will be urinating on him. When the child grows up, and someone wants to marry her . . . that pain that he endured . . . means the man was really banintan paa [a good parent]. The money, you call boba. So when the man is now coming to take the daughter, he has to pay for the pain. That is called ntamoba. It is for the girl's father ... [and] if anything happens in the family, he [the father] will know that the man has really married his daughter.
[Banahene interview]7
Nana Baffuor Osei Akoto, another of the Asantehene's senior linguists and, at age 92, widely regarded as a leading authority on custom and tradition, also associates ntamoba with marriage and the payment of a fee by the husband-to-be to his future father-in-law (Akoto interview).
But other older Asantes, many of them outside of Kumasi proper, connect ntamoba not with rites of marriage but with rites of birth. Yaa Dufie of Effiduasi explains that 'when you give birth to a child and you are going to name the child, the things that the father brings to the child after the naming are called ntamoba' (Dufie interview). Efua Tebiaa of Agogo provides a similar definition, along with some etymological detail. She suggests that the term comes from the phrase tan a wo ba (the father who has given birth to a child) and that, in order for a man to be recognised as tan a wo ba, he must meet certain financial obligations: '. . . if the father gives birth to a child and he doesn't look after the child, and the child grows, and he wants to go for the child, he will be asked to pay all the expenses that the woman incurred in looking after the child' (A. Sewaa interview).
While Efua Tebiaa's definition of ntamoba seems to bear some relation to the kind of exchange being acted out in the Bompata case, the two concepts are certainly not identical. One is related to the establishing of rights in a child and the other is related to the termination of those rights. I have so far encountered only three oral accounts of ntamoba which parallel the meaning implicit in the Bompata case. In 1992 Ama Nyarko of Kumasi explained that if a man married a woman, had children with her, and did not take care of those children, the woman's family could remove the children from him. If the man then swore that the children should not attend his funeral, that is, that he was severing all connection with them, it was called ntamoba. Ama Nyarko did not link the term with any specific payment, just to the severing of a father's rights (Nyarko interview). Thomas E. Kyei, an Asante educator who worked with Meyer Fortes on the Ashanti Social Survey,8 remembers ntamoba in much the same way as Danquah reported it in 1928, as a sum 'paid by the family to the father to signify that the father has been relieved of all the fatherhood responsibilities.' Kyei recalls only one such case from his childhood in Agogo. 'There have to be extraordinary circumstances,' he explains, 'for a father's rights in his children to be totally severed' (Kyei interview).9
In the summer of 1995 I finally stumbled upon someone whose definition of ntamoba not only paralleled the meaning implicit in the Bompata case but derived from personal experience. Kwame Nkansah, a 90 year old man living in Agogo, explained; 'You have given birth to a son. You have raised him and then he says he will not serve you. Then you have to get ntamoba. You will get it from his family.' He recalled being told as a child that ntamoba was demanded of his family. His grandmother had given birth to his mother and an uncle. Instead of serving their father, the two went to stay with their uncle in Akyem. 'When they came back,' he recalled, 'the father said, no, he would not respond, and they asked why. He said now they know where they come from, and he will demand ntamoba. He demanded [from the family] ?3 for each of them' (Nkansah interview).
ABERRATION OR ARTEFACT: HISTORICISING THE CONFLICTING FRAGMENTS
So what is one to make of these conflicting and contradictory definitions-ntamoba as any number of marriage payments, ntamoba as a rite connected with birthing and naming, and ntamoba as marking the termination of a father's rights in his offspring? That the definition of ntamoba as a marriage payment to the wife's father was widespread in Kumasi, especially around the Asantehene's court, and that the definitions closest to the Bompata case seem to derive, like the Bompata material, either from Asante Akyem or from Akyem itself, may suggest that the inconsistencies here are simply geographical. This simple formulation, however, would not explain why many older, long-time inhabitants of Agogo (Asante Akyem) unequivocally define ntamoba as a marriage payment, or why the informants in M. J. Field's 1938 study in Akyem offered similar testimony. The problem may, indeed, be one not simply of location but of time and of social rank. What happens if, rather than dismissing the 1921 Bompata case as local aberration, we investigate it as historical artefact?
First of all, we should recognise that the multiple definitions emerging in both oral and written sources are not entirely disconnected. They all seem to share an underlying concern for a husband/father's reciprocal obligations and rights vis-a-vis his wife's and/or his children's family, or abusua. All these definitions situate ntamoba as a mechanism through which an abusua's relationship with the husbands/fathers of its members is mediated. That the connections among definitions may be quite close-indeed, that they may begin to collapse one upon the other with closer inspection-is suggested by Akua Senti's remarks: You see, normally they do the [marriage] rites twice-once for the uncle and once for the father. In fact, the one for the father is called ntamoba. In the olden days, about a week after a child is born, a father will name the child. If a girl, he will give her a cloth to lie on. It is called ntam. So when it is time for the girl to get married, and the man is doing the rites, the man will pay back the father's ntam, that which the father paid when he was naming the child, his daughter. [ 
Senti interview]10
For Senti, all of ntamoba's definitions seem to simmer down into one transactive meaning. Indeed, it may be useful for the moment to take this sort of generic notion of ntamoba and situate it among the bits of evidence we have regarding a father's rights in and obligations toward his children in the pre-colonial and early colonial periods. This process may provide at least some clues to the disappearance of ntamoba from the historical record.
And what do we know of fathering in pre-colonial Asante? Unfortunately, the record is scant and uneven, our best sources still being the works of the anthropologist R. S. Rattray. Admittedly, Rattray paints a picture of the 'Ashanti father' in a rather normative, unchanging world. However, his early twentieth-century informants do open an important window into the last half of the nineteenth century. Much of Rattray's presentation on the 'status and position of the Ashanti father', as he terms it, consists of quotes from 'fathers and mothers and uncles themselves' and those individuals were drawing on experience from the last decades before colonial rule (Rattray, 1929) . From them we learn that, while it was expected that children, especially sons, would live with their father once they passed infancy,11 a father by no means owned his children. He could not pawn them, and they could be removed from his care by the uncle, should the father be 'too poor to bring up the child properly'. One informant reported, 'A father has no real [legal?] power over his grown-up children. If they wish to go to their abusua [blood] he cannot prevent them' (Rattray, 1929: 8-10) . While a man passed on his ntoro (spirit) to his children, was responsible for naming them12 and, at the other end of the life cycle, his children were responsible for providing a coffin upon his death, obligations and rights over the intervening years were not rooted in notions of absolute ownership or final authority (Kyei, 1992; Fortes, 1950) . In short, a father was expected to raise his children, to discipline them and to train them; in turn, he could expect to be served by them, but under no circumstances did he own them.
Ntamoba in its generic form makes complete sense in the late nineteenth/ early twentieth-century framework sketched above, particularly if life cycles are drawn into the picture. It seems to articulate the kind of exchange in marriage and parenting whereby a husband/father and an abusua entered into an ongoing process of transacting duties for rights of use. We can see, for example, that a father's right of access to his children was initiated with his completion of the rites of naming.'3 As a result of naming his child, the father accepted the responsibility for training her/him. He now had certain legitimate duties toward and claims upon the child which the child's mother and her abusua were bound to recognise. If, after the child had reached an age when he/she should be serving the father and did not, the father could demand the return of ntamoba in compensation, because he had met his obligations but was being denied his rights of use, either by the child's behaviour or by a decision of the abusua. Paternal obligations and rights, therefore-the father's connection with his child's abusua-could be terminated by the father demanding and receiving ntamoba or by the mother's family offering and the father accepting ntamoba as indemnification.'4 Finally, we can see ntamoba mediating the relationship between a father and the man his daughter intended to marry. This may be seen as the penultimate manifestation of ntamoba in the life cycle of a father/daughter relationship, the final one being the daughter's obligation to contribute to the cost of her father's coffin. In this context the father as banintan a wo ba. as the one who parented this girl child, was compensated by the husband-to-be and, in turn, was now released from any obligation to his daughter. The primary reciprocal relationship (obligations in exchange for rights of use) involving the daughter would now be between her abusua and her new husband (who in some senses replaced the father). Of course, what is particularly interesting about this transaction is its gender specificity. There was nothing similar to mark a transformation in the father's responsibilities toward and rights of use in his grown son. Indeed, much of the evidence we have suggests that a father's reciprocal relationship with his son and his son's family was far more enduring than that with his daughter.15 A father, according to Rattray, was supposed to find a wife for his son and pay the 'headmoney' for him. The father will give his son a dampon (sleeping room) ... and a pato ... in which the wife will cook. He will stay with his father until his father dies, and then may go to his own uncle. [Rattray, 1929: 9]16 In other words, a father's active reciprocal relationship with his son/son's abusua was maintained throughout the father's lifetime.17 That with his daughter and her abusua virtually ended with the daughter's marriage, the only remaining service due being the daughter's obligation to help pay for her father's coffin.
The generic ntamoba that I have interpolated into Rattray's early twentieth-century evidence gives us some sense, normative though it may be, that ownership of children in Asante was supposed to rest firmly with their abusua. A father's rights in his children were supposed to be rights of use only, despite the fact that a child, particularly a male child, might spend his entire life in his father's house. That a father's rights of use were so defined is best evidenced by the fact that a father could not pawn his children, though he could receive them in pawn (Austin, 1994: 193) .18 That his rights, moreover, were temporally circumscribed is evidenced in the role of ntamoba in his daughter's marriage. Over the course of a life cycle, a father's rights of use in and his duties and obligations toward his children changed according to the children's age and gender. Ntamoba, we can hypothesise, may have been transacted in many forms, but its basic role as definer and mediator of paternal obligations and rights of use appears remarkably consistent, from naming to marrying. Indeed, these dynamic and complex processes of exchange seem much less confusing when one recalls the proverb Gyadua si abontene ne hi wo fi (Rattray, 1929: 19 But if we can, for the moment, accept the basic premise that ntamoba existed at some time in some parts of Asante (but that European writers, for whatever reasons, could not always 'see' it), then how may we begin to explain, historically, its disappearance from certain parts of the social fabric? I would like to propose here a two-stage hypothesis that attempts to foreground time and social place/status as key variables in explaining the disappearance of ntamoba. The first stage is based on the postulation that ntamoba is of great antiquity, that as a mechanism for mediating the relationship between a man and his wife/children's abusua it may very well date back to the creation, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, of the great Akan matriclans. Ivor Wilks has argued, quite convincingly, that we can associate the emergence of the abusua-kese (big lineage) with the clearing of the forest and the development of food crop cultivation. The matriclans, quite simply, served to 'facilitate the assimilation of strangers and ... of the unfree labour being drawn into the forest country'. Yet the labour necessary during peak periods in the cycle of cultivation (the felling of large trees, for example, or the clearing of land) required co-operation among several domestic groups. That co-operation, Wilks argues, was 'the most common between groups linked by marriage: that is, that a man obtains the help of his wife's brother (and thereby often procures the services of his own grown son)' (Wilks, 1993b: 41-90, esp. 62 and 81). Ntamoba, I would suggest, makes complete sense in this framework as a way of mediating and articulating a father's access to the labour of his wife, his children and their abusua.
But does ntamoba continue to make sense, as we move from Asante's immediate protohistorical period (firi tetemu) to the historical? The answer is-for some, yes, but for others, no. The emergence of the Akan state (oman) coincided with the emergence of specific social groups or classes for whom ntamoba would have made little sense. Again, Wilks's work on Asante's early history provides some important clues. In 'Founding the political kingdom' he argues for the critical role of entrepreneurs ('big men' or aberempan) in the founding of the early Akan state. 'Those who controlled the production and sale of gold,' he proposes, were those able to procure a supply of unfree labor. Those who procured unfree labor were those able to create arable land within the forest. Those who created the arable were those who founded the numerous Akan polities. We see, in other words, a class of Akan entrepreneurs emerging: a class of those able to use the strength of the world bullion market, and the availability of labor locally (whether through Wangara or Portuguese suppliers), in such a way as to create the new agrarian system. [1993a: 96]
The descendants of these early developers became the nobility, the adehyes, of the state, and were distinguished from both free settlers (amanmufo) and from the unfree. Many from among this latter group, Wilks hypothesises, were incorporated into Akan society as members of the gyaasefo ('the people of the hearth') who were the servants of the nobility. Certainly, for the nobility and for the unfree, ntamoba could not mediate transactions surrounding marriage and child-rearing in the same way it did for freeborn commoners. For example, the slave wives of an aberempon gave birth to children who were incorporated into their father's lineage, not into the lineage of their mother, who was considered kinless. While ntamoba as a marriage payment to the aberempan father may make sense here, little else does, for the father and his royal lineage quite clearly owned such children and had rights over them that a male commoner married to a female commoner simply did not.20 The meaning of patrilineality, in other words, had to become class/rank-specific. I would like to suggest, therefore, that the first stage in ntamoba's fracturing and eventual disappearance coincided with the emergence of the state in the Akan forest.21 While ntamoba could continue to articulate the ongoing exchange between a common man and the abusua of his free wives and children, it was obsolete in the realm of power, wealth and privilege in which both oberempan and gyaasefo operated. In that world, trees might stand in the street but-the Akan proverb notwithstanding-the roots of some of them could be found there, as well.
Certainly ntamoba would not have been the only social transaction reconfigured or even undermined by the emergence of the Akan state. Adultery (ayerefa) may provide an interesting parallel. We know from our very earliest sources that, among commoners, when a man's wife had a sexual connection with another man, the husband was entitled to a small compensation (ayefare). The case was considered a domestic matter (efiesam). To have a connection with the wife of an officeholder, however, was a crime against the state (dman akyiwadie) and compensation was awarded based upon the rank of the man whose sexual rights in his wife had been violated. Compensation could range from a substantial quantity of gold to capital punishment for the offender, the wife and members of her family (Bowdich, 1824: 259; McCaskie, 1981; Allman, 1997). Adultery compensation came to reflect and articulate power relations within the Asante state. Ntamoba may have been reconfigured in similar ways. For those with power, it seems to have become a simple marriage payment, but for commoners it probably continued as an important mechanism for transacting exchanges between a husband and his wife/children's abusua well into the nineteenth century. That the meaning of ntamoba may have been class/rank-specific for a very long time could very well explain why those so close to the Asante court today (including Akyeame Nana Owusu Banahene and Nana Baffuor Akoto) insist on ntamoba's exclusive rendering as a marriage payment,22 while those further from the court, both in physical distance and in terms of social identity, seem more likely to posit a range of definitions, including the one so central to the 1921 Bompata case.
But, that particular case notwithstanding, by the time we reach the restoration of the Asante Confederacy Council in 1935, if not decades before, ntamoba clearly exists only in a rare, vestigial form and primarily as a type of marriage payment. Even among commoners we have only scant evidence of its existence. Why? It is my speculation that ntamoba vanishes among commoners in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for the same reason it was reconfigured among Asante's ruling classes hundreds of years before. To put it quite simply, ntamoba no longer made sense for anyone-rulers or ruled, noble or commoner. And it no longer made sense because a commoner father's rights in his children, like an oberempon's rights over his non-free children, had become inalienable. His role vis-ai-vis his children had been transformed from one of rights of use bound to reciprocal obligations to one of outright ownership. His relationship to his offspring was no longer part of a complex process of exchange with their abusua. It stood alone as fact; it no longer worked as process. In this new configuration, how could a father be compensated for the loss of use rights in his children when those rights had been transformed into rights of ownership that were, at once, inalienable?
The forces behind this more recent transformation were undoubtedly many and multivalent and a full account would require a detailed social history of Asante's late nineteenth and early twentieth-century past. This is not the place to undertake such a monumental project, though it is long overdue.23 What we can do at this stage is identify areas worthy of investigation on the basis of existing evidence-evidence gathered primarily from customary court records, missionary and government documentation and personal narratives. These sources suggest that we should look closely at (1) the impact of cocoa and cash on Asante family economy, (2) the ideological influence of missions on Asante conceptions of marriage and family, and (3) the specific effects of schools and school fees on family economy. These areas of investigation are far from discrete; they overlap and are mutually constitutive. However, for the sake of clarity and organisation in this brief discussion, it may be useful to treat them separately.
That cocoa and the broad-based exchange economy that followed in its wake upset the 'old order of economic relations between wife and husband', as K. Abu has written, would be disputed by few (Abu, 1983: 160; Allman, 1996; Austin, 1987; Dunn and Robertson, 1973; Grier, 1992; Hill, 1963; Mikell, 1989; Okali, 1983; Vellenga, 1986) . The relations of production in cocoa seemed to erode, though certainly not destroy, Asante notions of matrilineal inheritance and to lend primacy to economic relations among members of the conjugal family. As Austin and others have shown, the labour necessary for the initial expansion of cocoa into Asante came 'very largely from established, non-capitalist sources', including 'farmowners themselves, their families, their slaves and pawns, co-operative groups of neighbours and, in the case of chiefs, corvee labour provided by their subjects' (Austin, 1987: 260-2; Grier, 1992: 314; Austin, 1994; 137-45). After the abolition of slavery and of pawning in 1908, wives' and children's labour became increasingly important, particularly for the establishment of farms on the cocoa frontier. By the end of World War I there was little land available for cocoa cultivation around Kumasi or to its south and east, so the industry began to spread westward, and in these frontier areas, particularly when farmers had little access to cash, there was heavy reliance on the labour of wives and offspring (Adomako-Sarfoh, 1974; Okali, 1983). Quite early, therefore, the conjugal-centred nature of the labour process on the cocoa frontier pitted wives and children against their husband's/father's matrikin. The labour invested in a husband/father's cocoa farm could yield no longterm security, since the husband owned the farm and product, fully controlled the proceeds, and members of his matrilineal family, by Asante customs of inheritance, were to succeed to the property.
Throughout the first decades of the twentieth century wives, children and, at times, even husbands challenged matrilineal inheritance on the grounds that wives' and children's labour investment in a cocoa farm contributed to the husband/father's wealth.24 Many argued for the right of wives and children to inherit at least a portion of the estate.25 At times, husbands willed cocoa farmers to their wives or children to prevent their matrikin from inheriting the property and in acknowledgement of the labour invested by their conjugal family. Many women and children were not so fortunate, however, and their experiences mirror those of Akua-Addae of Tafo, who, with their daughters, assisted her husband on his cocoa farm for many years. When he continually refused to give them even a portion of the farm, or to include such provision in his will, Akua divorced him. 'I would not continue to marry him,' she recalled (Addae interview). Personal reminiscences like these make it abundantly clear that cocoa and the exchange economy did not automatically lead to the destruction of matrilineal inheritance, and Okali (Allman, 1994 (Allman, , 1996 . But what did reach from the mission school right into the web of crisscrossing obligations and rights within the family was school fees.31 Although a much more narrowly defined field of investigation than cocoa or missionary ideology, school fees, I would argue, cut right to the heart of daily negotiations over child-rearing. Indeed, nearly every older Asante to whom I have spoken over the past four years has mentioned school fees-for boys and for girls-as a never-ending source of conflict between mothers and fathers. A focus on this new family expenditure, therefore, can lend important insight into transformations within family economy, particularly in the changing rights and obligations of fathers. As mentioned above, before the advent of mission schools in Asante, a father was responsible for the training of his children, particularly his sons. It is not surprising, therefore, that, when mission schools and fees entered the picture in the early twentieth century, most understood the fees to be the responsibility of the father. But a father's cash expenditure on education could not simply replace a father teaching a son, for example, to farm or to hunt. It brought with it an assumption of greater rights of use in, and perhaps even ownership of, children. In other words, cash investment in a child's education transformed a father's role within his conjugal family. We can catch glimpses of this process in a 1936 case heard before the Asantehene's Divisional Court B. Kwasi Quansah filed suit against R. A. Mensah for ?100 damages. He claimed that his daughter, Mary Quansah, while engaged to another man, was impregnated by Mr Mensah, a teacher at his daughter's school in Kumasi. The future husband subsequently refused to marry Quansah's daughter. The ?100, according to the plaintiff, represented the expenses he had incurred as a result of supporting his daughter through her pregnancy and after the birth. They also reflected the fact that the defendant had 'spoiled my daughter's school time', thus adversely affecting her future economic well-being (Asantehene's Divisional Court B, 1936). In many ways the facts of this case are telling. Mr Quansah filed the suit alone; no representatives of Mary's matrikin were present. None, apparently, assisted her during her pregnancy. Moreover, unlike the daughter in Rattray's account, who was trained in her father's house, served him and then went off to marry, Quansah's daughter went to school. Quansah had invested heavily in her education and appeared to exercise full rights of ownership over her. As a result of the pregnancy, his cash investment in her future had been jeopardised, so he sought legal recourse.
Kwasi Quansah was certainly not alone. Colonial era documentation, from customary court records to district commissioner diaries, is replete with stories of individuals seeking recompense or satisfaction amidst the chaos and conflict generated by the factors highlighted here: by cocoa, mission ideology or the simple introduction of school fees. The testimony recorded in those cases provides invaluable insight into the ways in which broad social forces could play out in an individual's life. The judgements, moreover, allow us to look for trends, for changes in so-called 'customary law' in colonial Asante. For our purposes here, they provide an important, though still tentative, index of social change. The work I have done with cases over the past six years,32 for example, suggests a gradual trend in the kinds of judgements rendered in child custody/child support cases-a trend away from insisting on the reciprocity of a father's rights and a father's obligations to the recognition of paternal rights independent of the fulfilment of any obligations toward wife and/or children. The very earliest of these recorded cases (before 1910) were heard before colonial officials who seemed to be utterly confused. They understood that children 'belonged to the mother's family', but were in complete disagreement Other cases, particularly as we move into the Second World War, were less likely to enforce reciprocity and therefore more likely to uphold paternal rights independent of paternal duties. Ama Manu v. Kwasi Buo (Asantehene's Divisional Court B, 1940) is a case in point. Here Ama Manu claimed ?8 5s Od in maintenance and subsistence from her exhusband. She testified that she had been married to the defendant's brother, but that the brother had gotten quite sick and was unable to support her and their children. She asked for a divorce, but his family asked her to wait. When her husband died, his brother agreed to take her as his wife. 'Nine months passed,' Ama testified, 'and nobody subsisted me and so some man had sexual connection with me.' Kwasi Buo then demanded that she name the offender, so he could collect an adultery payment. In his defence Kwasi Buo argued that he was 'not liable to pay any subsistence or maintenance fee to her, especially as her husband was sick and she was misconducting herself with other men'. The court ruled against the plaintiff, finding that her 'behaviour toward her sick husband' meant she was 'customarily not entitled to any subsistence by the defendant'. The judgement in this case is particularly telling because the reciprocity in earlier cases is simply not enforced here or, from another perspective, is enforced but in one direction only. Ama's and her children's right to subsistence was made dependent upon Ama's fidelity. Paternal rights, however, stood alone. They did not rest on the ability or the willingness of either her first husband or his brother (second husband) to provide Ama and her children, with subsistence.
In cases like this, and countless others, ntamoba makes absolutely no sense, because paternal rights were, at once, severed from paternal duties and transformed from rights of use to inalienable rights of ownership. Indeed, a father's relation to his child and to his wife's children's abusua resembled nothing less than the relations which prevailed in pre-colonial and early colonial times, when a father held his child as a pawn-a practice technically outlawed by the British in 1908.34 As Rattray wrote, a father could not pawn his child, but he could receive the child as a pawn from the child's abusua. When this occurred, a different set of rights and duties was conferred upon the father. He was now entitled to half of any profits made by the child and he had a 'legal right [inalienable right?] to the child's services and ... might take him away without asking the permission of the abusua'. In the case of a pawned daughter, the father's role in any marriage arrangements became paramount. He received the largest share of the aseda [thank-you offering] and retained 'more control over the daughter than either the husband or the woman's abusua' after the marriage (Rattray, 1929: 24, 51) . A father also became responsible for half his child/pawn's debts. A father was not liable for the debts of his free child (adehye wo). These points are particularly important because we begin to see customary courts of the post-1924 period rendering judgements which uphold, in quite specific and explicit ways, the sorts of rights and duties which were associated with fathers and pawnchildren-but long after the abolition of pawnage, when all children, at least in the eyes of the law, were free-born. For example, in the 1929 case between Akosua Adae and Kwaku Ahindwa (Native Tribunal of the Kumasihene, 1929a), the plaintiff complained that her ex-husband was not paying the debts incurred by their children. The court ultimately ruled that Ahindwa could have no 'right of commanding his children' until he paid half the debts incurred by his children. While the judgement in this case upheld some sort of reciprocity, it was the reciprocity of a father/pawn-child relationship, not that of a father and a free-born child.
That pawnage, rather than being effectively abolished, became hidden within a changing family economy is certainly evident in the recent, pathbreaking works of G. Austin That matriliny could accommodate growing patriarchal power should come as no surprise. Anthropologists and historians alike have long understood the incredible flexibility of matrilineal organisations. Wilks, in particular, makes a convincing case (1993b) for locating the very origins of matrilineality in an Akan agrarian revolution that required a flexible mechanism for mobilising and incorporating vast numbers of unfree labourers into an expanding agricultural society. The subsequent emergence of the Akan state (aman) and increased social differentiation based on wealth and political power did not render matrilineal organisation obsolete. Indeed, Douglas's 1969 conclusion that matriliny is not necessarily doomed by increasing wealth still seems to hold more than a quarter of a century later. 'Matriliny would be capable of flourishing in market economies,' Douglas wrote, whenever the demand for men is higher than the demand for things. Because of the scope it gives for personal unascribed achievement of leadership, matrilineal kinship could have advantages in an expanding market economy. On my view the enemy of matriliny is not the cow as such, not wealth as such, not economic development as such, but economic restriction. [Douglas, 1971: 123-37] But the flexibility or adaptability highlighted by Douglas and others requires historicising. We must not mistake the durability of matriliny in Asante for immutability. For example, when we try to make sense of ntamoba in the context of a domestic economy of child-rearing in colonial Asante, we see fundamental transformations occurring in the power of husbands/fathers visa-vis their wives/children. These transformations occurred without undermining the basic structures of matrilineal kinship. This was no zerosum game.
As a father's rights grew increasingly inalienable in colonial Asante, they were detached from any reciprocal obligations to his children. A father owned his children whether he provided them with subsistence or not. This transformation occurred at a time when the economic cost of rearing children, particularly as a result of school fees, was rising dramatically. That cost would not be integrated into an ongoing system of exchange between a father and his children's mother and their abusua. A father would not be obliged to meet them in order to retain his rights of use in his children. Indeed, there were increasingly fewer ways to encourage/force/persuade a father to view those costs as his obligation, because none of his actions or inactions could threaten his ownership of the children. Fatherhood was now a position endowed with inalienable rights; it was not something you did, that you negotiated via extended processes of exchange involving rights and service.
The implications of these developments were obviously far-reaching and even a brief consideration would take me well beyond the bounds of this article. It is, however, important to note in concluding that much of the burden of these profound transformations in the domestic economy of childrearing fell quite squarely on the shoulders of Asante mothers. While some women were fortunate in that the father of their children assumed responsibility for school fees, provided funds for clothing and feeding those children and cared for them in their mother's absence, others were certainly not so lucky. The fathers of their children did not contribute to subsistence, much less to school fees, yet what recourse was there? What pressure could be brought to bear? The obligation to parent (-tan) and to sustain children was now a woman's alone. Thus the final disappearance of ntamoba-even with the sketchy bits of evidence we have-tells us much about the ways mothering in colonial Asante was transformed alongside fatherhood. Though by appearances Asante mothers were doing much what they had done in the nineteenth century-feeding, bathing and clothing their children-they were doing it in a world in which there were far fewer safety nets for them or for their children. It was a world in which more was expected but less was obliged. As 80 year old Efua Sewaa of Tafo recently remarked, 'You begot the child. You delivered that child. It is the duty of the mother, whether she likes it or not, to look after the child. An uncle, or aunt, or father, or anyone else, they just look after a child when they feel like it' (E. Sewaa interview). Trying to make sense of ntamoba, if it achieves nothing more, should at least make us stop and reflect on statements like these. Are they mere essentialist ponderings on the inevitable and eternal burdens of motherhood, or have they been historically constructed in ways we should now begin to untangle? 'Akim' and 'Akyem' reflect two different orthographies. The 'ky' (pronounced 'ch') more accurately captures speech patterns and is more commonly used today. I use 'Akim' only when it appears in the title of a reference, as it does here.
3 For a discussion of the origins and the uses of oaths in bringing about court cases see Rattray (1927 Rattray ( , 1929 . Briefly, to swear an oath (ntam) is to make public reference to some specific disaster in the past in order to underscore the gravity of a particular situation. To swear an oath in a household dispute (efiesem) was to raise that dispute immediately to the level of a crime against the state (oman akyiwadie) which required a hearing before the central authority. 18 While there are a few early twentieth-century cases of fathers pawning their own children, they tell us more about the chaos of the early colonial years and individuals' attempts to take advantage of British confusion over various customs than they do about definitions. As Austin convincingly argues, virtually all of our nineteenth and early twentieth-century sources state that fathers could not pawn their children, and the few that suggest they could state that a father's pawning of his children was always subject to the approval of the child's matrikin. 26 It is highly probable that these changes in family economy occurred in some areas of Asante long before the advent of cocoa. The rubber trade of the last quarter of the nineteenth century or even the kola trade of earlier decades may have already begun to transform domestic relations of production and exchange. We certainly have evidence of the ways in which pawning (including of wives and children) was impacted by the expansion of the kola and then the rubber trade (Austin, 1994: 134 and n. 110). Also see Arhin (1965; 1972) and Dumett (1971) . 27 An early case from Bompata demonstrates the ways in which both inheritance (of a cocoa farm) and the missionary presence could factor into a divorce and child custody case. On 23 October 1920 Afua Ntumkrum sued her 'adopted' husband (her deceased first husband's nephew) for forcing her and her children out and refusing to give them any of the first husband's estate. Afua claimed that her first husband was a Christian and that she and her children were entitled to two-thirds of her husband's estate. The tribunal ultimately ruled that both the first and the second marriages were under 'native custom' and that mission inheritance rules did not apply. The wife was allowed to keep only the one cocoa farm her husband had given her before his death. See Native Tribunal of the Omanhene of Bompata (1920).
28 See Allman (1994). For comparative material see especially the wonderful collection of essays brought together by Hansen (1992) . 29 The 1884 
